Este trabalho analisa as razões do recorrente fracasso das reformas tributárias no Brasil. A análise mostrou que as explicações correntes na literatura política (ingovernabilidade, veto federativo, oposição do empresariado e desinteresse do Executivo) não são suficientes para explicar tais fracassos. Introduz, pois, uma nova hipótese: a estratégia política da reforma. A ampla insatisfação com os tributos no Brasil induz o governo a propor reformas abrangentes, que alteram muitos aspectos da intrincada estrutura tributária, o que gera conflitos multidimensionais, ou seja, o aparecimento de diversas clivagens políticas simultâneas. Como comparação, foram analisadas as reforma do Judiciário, a reforma administrativa e alterações menores no sistema tributário. O resultado mostrou que as reformas tributárias tentavam impor custos concentrados a um maior número de atores, facilitando a formação de uma coalizão de veto.
The paper analyses the reasons for the recurrent failure of tax reform in Brazil. The analysis show that the current explanations provided by the political literature (ingovernability, federal veto, opposition from business community, lack of political will of the government) are not enough to explain such failure. The issue of the political strategy for the reform is the hypothesis discussed in the paper. The widespread dissatisfaction with taxes in Brazil induces the government to propose comprehensive reforms altering many aspects of the intricate tax structure of the country. Such proposals have been generating multidimensional conflicts, i.e. many concurrent political divisions. With the purpose of providing elements for comparison, the judicial and the administrative reforms were analyzed, as well as were minor changes in the tax system. The results showed that the tax reforms imposed concentrated costs on a greater number of actors, favoring the formation of a veto coalition.
Ce travail analyse les raisons de l’échec récurrent des réformes fiscales au Brésil. Il montre que les explications habituellement avancées dans la littérature politique (ingouvernabilité, veto fédératif, opposition de l’entrepreneuriat et désintérêt du pouvoir exécutif) ne sont pas suffisantes pour expliquer de tels échecs. D’où l’introduction d’une nouvelle hypothèse: la stratégie politique de la réforme. La grande insatisfaction par rapport aux impôts amène le gouvernement brésilien à proposer des réformes globales qui modifient plusieurs aspects de la structure fiscale inextricable, ce qui entraîne des conflits multidimensionnels, c’est-à-dire plusieurs clivages politiques spontanés. En guise de comparaison, l’étude s’est penchée sur la réforme du judiciaire, sur la réforme administrative et sur les altérations mineures du système fiscal. Les résultats indiquent que les réformes fiscales tentent de concentrer les coûts sur un plus grand nombre d’acteurs, facilitant ainsi la formation d’un veto coalisé.